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I. The Puzzle of Cooperative Behavior
Nature is full of examples in which individuals of different species
cooperate with each other. Some of these interactions (mutualisms) are
crucial to the persistence of the world that we know: most plants need
mycorrhizal fungi and/or rhizobial bacteria for successful growth, as well as
pollinators for reproduction; coral reefs are the result of a mutualistic
symbiosis between polyps and algae; and virtually all animals appear to
have endosymbionts that help with digestion of food. Other mutualisms
attract human attention because of their oddity: birds and fish that enter
the mouths of predators in search of food, birds that lead other animals to a
mutually appreciated food source, and anemones that defend the crabs on
whose backs they ride.
Darwin (1859) was well aware that interspecific mutualism, like intraspe-
cific cooperation, provided a challenge to his theory of evolution. Selection
favors individuals that behave selfishly and maximize their own benefit.
Cooperative behavior, however, often involves costly investment by one
individual for the benefit of its partner. This puzzle of cooperative behavior
is best illustrated with the so-called prisoner’s dilemma game. In this game,
each of two genetically unrelated players can either cooperate or defect.
Both players receive a payoff from the interaction (assumed to be of some
relevance to the players’ fitness) that depends on the combination of
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behaviors the two players have performed. The payoff matrix is con-
structed such that (1) both players receive a higher payoff from mutual
cooperation than from mutual defection, (2) each player receives a higher
payoff from defecting than from cooperating, irrespective of the partner’s
action, and (3) the player invariably receives a higher payoff if the partner
cooperates than when the partner defects. Thus, cooperative behavior is an
altruistic act in this game, an investment in the partner’s fitness. Not
surprisingly, mutual defection is the only evolutionarily stable outcome
under these conditions. Thus, even if the partner cooperates and invests,
selection should favor individuals that do not invest in return (both reduced
investment and active exploitation are what we refer to as cheating). Why,
then, does cooperative behavior seem to be ubiquitous in nature? Further-
more, why do individuals of one species invest in individuals of another
species?
II. Game Theoretical Approaches to Mutualism
Initially, most theoretical work on the evolutionary stability of coopera-
tive behavior/altruism focused on cooperation within species. Here, the
explanation for many cases seems to be linked to the existence of kin
selection (Hamilton, 1964). However, examples of within-species coopera-
tion exist in which the partners are unrelated. Furthermore, kin selection
cannot explain any example of interspecific mutualism.
Trivers (1971) proposed that both intraspecific cooperation and interspe-
cific mutualism can evolve and be maintained when the same individuals
interact repeatedly with each other. His idea of reciprocal altruism was
formalized by Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) via an iterated version of the
prisoner’s dilemma game. In brief, Axelrod and Hamilton found, in a
computer simulation tournament with a variety of strategies, that a simple
strategy called ‘‘Tit-for-Tat’’ could emerge as a cooperative solution to the
game. Tit-for-Tat players begin the game by cooperating and then, in
subsequent rounds, do what their partners did in the previous round. For
some time, the iterated prisoner’s dilemma was the paradigm for theoreti-
cal studies on the evolution of cooperation (reviewed by Dugatkin, 1997).
However, empiricists seem to have found it difficult to relate the coopera-
tive strategies proposed by theoreticians, including Tit-for-Tat and its
successors (Dugatkin, 1997), to real-world cooperative interactions. There
are a few examples in which an observed case of intraspecific cooperation
seems consistent with game theory models (Dugatkin, 1997). The situation
is different with regard to interspecific mutualism, however. Researchers at
the 90th Dahlem workshop, on the evolution of cooperation, argued that
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there is not a single suspected example of mutualism for which (1) the
payoff matrix can be described adequately by the prisoner’s dilemma
game, and (2) the partners behave as predicted from cooperative solutions
to the iterated prisoner’s dilemma game (Bergstrom et al., 2003).
Three other game theoretic concepts that until now have attracted less
attention have been seen to be more promising frameworks to explain
the evolutionary stability of cooperation and mutualism: by-product mutu-
alism, pseudoreciprocity, and biological market theory. By-product
mutualism (Brown, 1983) is a confusing term, because it was developed
to explain intraspecific cooperation rather than interspecific mutualism.
However, the concept applies to both sets of interactions, and yields a
simple, straightforward explanation for the occurrence of cooperative be-
havior: each individual acts selfishly, and the benefits to other individuals
accrue as a simple by-product of their behavior. As there is no costly
investment on the part of the partners, no altruistic behavior must be
explained. This may be the reason why many researchers, in particular
theoreticians, tend to ignore this explanation (Dugatkin, 1997): it takes
away the most interesting aspect of cooperation. But at the same time, that
is the very argument for why this form of cooperation should be found
frequently in nature: because it does not pose any problems to either
player.
Pseudoreciprocity (Connor, 1986) differs from by-product mutualism in
two ways: (1) one or both partners invest in each other, and (2) investment
makes cooperative behavior the best option for the investing partner. The
second point is also the crucial difference between pseudoreciprocity and
the prisoner’s dilemma game, in which cheating invariably yields a higher
payoff in each round. In pseudoreciprocity, cooperative behavior yields the
highest possible payoff in each single round as long as the partner coop-
erates. The selfishness of cooperative behavior can be understood best with
optimality theory. If and only if investment by the partner is above a
critical threshold, it pays to perform an act that returns the investment.
Thus, there is still no risk that the altruist will be exploited.
Biological market theory proposes that cooperative or mutualistic inter-
actions can be viewed as an exchange of goods or commodities between
individuals that differ in the degree of control over these goods/commod-
ities (Noe¨, 2001). Control is used in a loose sense here; it may simply imply
that a commodity/good is easier to produce for one partner than for the
other. Trading partners can be chosen from a number of potential partners.
The focus of biological market theory has been to understand how supply
and demand ratios of the goods/commodities traded in combination with
partner choice opportunities determine the exchange rate (Hoeksema and
Schwartz, 2001, 2003; Noe¨, 2001; Noe¨ and Hammerstein, 1994; Noe¨ et al.,
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1991; Schwartz and Hoeksema, 1998). For example, market theory predicts
that the nectar-provisioning rate by lycaenid butterfly larvae to tending
ants (that would defend the larvae against predators) depends on variables
like predation risk, and the number of ants or other larvae present: de-
creasing predation risk and increasing number of ants reduces the larvae’s
demand for tending, hence larvae should reduce nectar production. The
ability to choose between partners may also be a mechanism that promotes
costly cooperative behavior in the form of investment (Bshary and Noe¨,
2003; Bshary and Scha¨ffer, 2002; Bull and Rice, 1991; Ferrie`re et al., 2002).
In particular, if a cheater that refrains from investing belongs to the
abundant trading class, it risks being abandoned by the choosing partner
and remaining partnerless for a long time, while the choosing partner will
easily find a new and hopefully more cooperative partner.
The concepts of by-product mutualism, pseudoreciprocity, and partner
choice may explain why cooperative behavior persists in mutualistic interac-
tions: either cooperative behavior may not be costly, or investment may yield
predictable benefits, or investment may secure repeated interactions. How-
ever, these game theoretic concepts are not the focus of most scientists
working on mutualism; most work on these interactions is ecological in nature
(Bronstein, 1994). One reason might be that game theoretical analyses of
mutualism have tended to treat the core interaction quite abstractly, focus-
ing on few aspects rather than explicitly considering a broad range of its
ecological or behavioral features. Admittedly, these features vary enor-
mously across particular forms of mutualism (pollination, dispersal, etc.),
often obscuring fundamental similarities across interactions differing great-
ly in natural history (Bronstein, 1994, 2001a). On the other hand, since
mutualisms are real interactions that function in real ecological settings,
excessive abstraction risks meaningless results. Here, we evaluate the game
theoretic approach, with its focus on behavioral strategies of individuals, to
identify its potential strength but also its shortcomings in light of empirical
knowledge about mutualistic systems. We identify 12 parameters that, in
combination, describe features of a mutualism that are relevant for gen-
erating a meaningful so-called game structure (Table I). By meaningful, we
mean that the game structure allows an exploration of the fitness conse-
quences of individual behavioral strategies that may resemble those that
partners actually use in the real world. The parameters can be seen as
important modules for the construction of a game, for which evolutionarily
stable behavioral strategies can be explored. For example, individuals may
interact once or repeatedly, both partners (or one partner, or neither) may
be mobile, and so on. We have chosen to examine eight relatively well-
understood kinds of mutualism. We have selected these mutualisms on the
basis of the following criteria: (1) the reciprocal benefits of the mutualism
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appear clear, and (2) enough is known about the natural history of both
species and their interactions to allow us to assess the various parameter
states. We recognize, however, that as more is learned about these inter-
actions, we are likely to find that we have misidentified one or more of
these parameter states. Indeed, one of our aims is to point to problematic
gaps in our empirical knowledge of these mutualisms.
III. Goals of This Article
1. We aim to evaluate the extent to which there are general features that
underlie many different mutualisms with respect to game structure.
The evolutionary and ecological backgrounds of different mutualisms
are highly diverse, prompting the question of whether it is appropriate
to categorize them at all. With respect to game theory and questions
about the evolutionary stability of mutualisms, one must ask how many
different game structures will be found. Does every mutualistic inter-
action exhibit a unique game structure, or are there important common
features? How uniform are game structures within broad classes of
mutualism, such as ‘‘cleaning mutualisms’’ or ‘‘pollination mutual-
isms,’’ which are defined by the actions of partners but may include a
wide range of taxa? How uniform are game structures within taxon-
specific mutualisms, such as ant–lycaenid interactions, which appear to
be relatively uniform with respect to what is traded between partners
TABLE I
Parameters Evaluated in Mutualistic Systemsa
Parameter Possible combinations (species 1/species 2)
Dependency high/high, high/low, low/high, low/low
Specificity high/high, high/low, low/high, low/low
N interactions repeated, one-off
Offer produced prior/during, during/during, during/prior, during/after
Moves simultaneous, alternating, sequential
Mobility mobile/mobile, mobile/sessile, sessile/mobile, sessile/sessile
Active choice yes/yes, yes/no, no/yes, no/no
Partner recognition yes/yes, yes/no, no/yes, no/no
Behavioral options allC/allC, C or D/allC, allC/C or D, C or D/C or D
Investment yes-no/yes-no, variable/yes-no, yes-no/variable, variable/variable
Payoff symmetry symmetrical, asymmetrical
Control over interaction full/full, full/limited, limited/full, limited/limited
aBehavioral options: individuals can either only cooperate (‘‘allC’’) or they can cooperate
or defect (‘‘C or D’’).
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and with respect to phylogeny, but which involve several thousand
different species with potentially very different ecological demands?
2. We aim to identify gaps in our empirical knowledge that limit our
ability to assess the game structure for certain mutualistic systems.
3. We aim to identify important ecological parameters. Ecological para-
meters are usually not captured by game theoretic approaches, but still
may be of fundamental importance for explaining individual behavior.
More generally, we hope to describe natural systems in a way that will
facilitate the development of theoretical concepts for mutualism. This in
turn will allow us to understand the basic rules for how cooperative behav-
ior between unrelated individuals may persist in nature. At this stage, a
descriptive, rather than abstract, theory-driven approach seems necessary
to facilitate communication between empiricists and theoreticians. More
specifically, we hope to provide empiricists with a framework for the kinds
of data theoreticians may find useful, and we hope to provide theoreticians
with a wealth of empirical information as a basis for future models. This task
is big enough to force us to refrain from using the data to develop theoreti-
cal predictions ourselves, or to evaluate the various existing concepts of
partner control. We also restrict ourselves to interspecific mutualism and do
not further discuss intraspecific cooperation. Intraspecific cooperation often
involves cases in which some partners are related to varying degrees, while
other partners are unrelated. In practice, it may therefore often be difficult
to distinguish between reciprocity arguments and kin selection arguments
for the evolution of cooperation in intraspecific interactions. Nevertheless,
we would predict that the principles that lead to stable mutualism may also
be relevant for intraspecific cooperation between unrelated individuals.
IV. Terminology
There has been considerable confusion about the use of terms like
cooperation, mutualism, and symbiosis. In brief, the verb ‘‘to cooperate’’
refers to a positive consequence (increased fitness) of the behavior of
individuals on the partners with which they interact (which can either be
conspecifics or allospecifics), without implying any cognitive abilities such
as intentionality. Cooperative behavior may be selfish (it directly increases
the fitness of the actor, irrespective of the partner’s action), cost-free, or a
costly investment. In the latter case, we refer to cooperative behavior as
being altruistic. We use this term with the knowledge that ultimately, we
will try to give a functional explanation for such altruistic behavior by
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explaining how the investment behavior promotes benefits that outweigh the
costs. Note that kin selection theory too starts with the observation of one
animal investing into another, and then explains this oddity away with the
concept of relatedness. The same is true for reciprocity based on the iterated
prisoner’s dilemma. ‘‘Cooperation’’ and ‘‘mutualism’’ refer to the outcome of
interactions: the terms are used if both partners receive a net benefit from the
interaction. We use the term ‘‘cooperation’’ as the outcome of intraspecific
cooperative behavior, and ‘‘mutualism’’ as the outcome of interspecific coop-
erative behavior. ‘‘Symbiosis’’ is an intimate spatial relationship between
individuals of different species; the outcome can be mutualistic, commensal,
or parasitic.
Another important terminological issue is what we mean by ‘‘cheating.’’
There has been reasonable confusion in the literature about what cheating
refers to and who cheaters are. For a definition of the behavior, we refer to
Bull and Rice (1991): an individual cheats if it provides less to its partner
than the average individual of its species would provide. This definition
acknowledges that cheating may be both a discrete behavior (e.g., an ant
eating an aphid) but more often a continuous one (a lycaenid butterfly
larva providing less nectar to tending ants than other larvae do). It also
acknowledges the existence of what Sherratt and Roberts (2001) called
phenotypic defectors. These are individuals who cannot invest (as much as
others) because they are in poor condition. From the partner’s point of
view, it should always respond to low payoffs, no matter whether its own
investment is not reciprocated because the other individual defects or
because it cannot reciprocate. We use the term ‘‘cheater’’ only for indivi-
duals that belong to the mutualist species under investigation. They may
either be individuals who always cheat (designated by Bronstein, 2001b, as
‘‘pure exploiters’’), or individuals that cooperate under some defined range
of conditions (‘‘conditional exploiters’’). Bronstein (2001b) also identified
‘‘exploiter species,’’ allospecific exploiters of mutualisms that cannot pro-
vide benefits but that take advantage of rewards and services designated
for the mutualistic partner. While they are an important ecological and
evolutionary problem for mutualisms (Bronstein, 2001b), we set exploiter
species aside for the purposes of this article.
V. Parameters Considered for the Assessment of
Game Structures
The prisoner’s dilemma game is a good starting point to illustrate the kinds
of parameters that might be important in defining the game structure of
mutualisms, and hence in exploring how evolutionary stability of cooperative
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behavior might be achieved. The version of the iterated prisoner’s dilemma
used by Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) for exploring mutualism made the
following assumptions: (1) players interact repeatedly; (2) players are as-
signed randomly to each other as partners; (3) players do not know a priori
how many rounds they will play; (4) both players have the same behavioral
options (i.e., to cooperate or to cheat); (5) investment in the partner is an
all-or-nothing behavior; (6) the payoffs are symmetrical for both players;
(7) the payoffs are constructed in such a way that cheating invariably yields
a higher payoff than cooperating; (8) the players’ moves are simultaneous;
and (9) the offers are produced during the interaction. No assumptions are
made regarding mobility of partners, nor whether partners recognize each
other on an individual basis (although it may be implied by the repeated
game structure). Nor are there any assumptions regarding whether indivi-
duals are limited in any way in their choice of partner species, or whether
they are strongly or weakly dependent on each other.
This particular combination of assumptions allows cooperative solutions
for mutualism, including Tit-for-Tat and its successors (Dugatkin, 1997).
Theorists have more recently recognized the artificiality of some of these
assumptions, however, and have altered them to generate alternative con-
ditions for the evolutionary stability of mutualism. Our goal here is not to
evaluate the newer modeling approaches (e.g., Doebeli and Knowlton,
1998; Ferrie`re et al., 2002; Roberts and Sherratt, 1998), but to describe
empirical examples of mutualism according to the list of parameters iden-
tified below. Note that each of the following 12 parameters may have
several potential states. We list possible states for all parameters based
on the empirical examples that we discuss in this article in Table I, and
briefly describe them below. We recognize that this list may be incomplete,
since in many cases other parameter states seem possible, at least in
principle.
Dependency: Mutualisms vary greatly in how crucial they are to survival
and reproduction of each partner. We distinguish between ‘‘high’’ depen-
dency for obligate mutualisms and ‘‘low’’ dependency for facultative
mutualisms (those in which individuals can survive and reproduce at
some level without mutualist partners). Dependency can be mutually high,
mutually low, or asymmetric.
Specificity: In some mutualisms, single partner species are matched
(‘‘high specificity’’), while in other systems, several partner species can
function as mutualists (‘‘low specificity’’). Again, specificity can be mutual-
ly high, mutually low, or asymmetric. Note that specificity may be low
even if one partner is very dependent on mutualistic interactions (i.e., in
cleaning mutualisms).
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N interactions: The number of interactions between two individual
partners in their lifetimes can be mutually repeated, mutually single, or
asymmetric.
Offer produced: Mutualisms are based on the provision of goods and/or
services to partners; we refer to these as ‘‘offers.’’ Note that offers are not
necessarily investments, as some offers in mutualisms are cost-free. Of
major interest to us is that offers can be produced before the interaction,
during the interaction, or even after the interaction. In addition, individuals
may produce an initial offer prior to the interaction, but produce more
during the interaction. Consequently, there are many parameter state com-
binations possible for the two partners (before–during, during–during, etc.).
Moves: The two players can make decisions about their behavior simulta-
neously or not. We refer to these decisions as ‘‘moves.’’ When moves are not
simultaneous, we use the term ‘‘alternating moves’’ if there are several rounds
of interactions between two individuals, and the term ‘‘sequential moves’’ if
there is only one round of interactions with a fixed sequence of decisions.
Mobility: Individuals may be capable of moving around freely (although
they may be constrained considerably through ecological limitations), or
may be sessile. Mobility can be mutual, one-sided, or nonexistent.
Active choice: This refers to the ability of individuals to seek out mutu-
alists by choosing to visit a subset of all possible partners. It is usually
but not always closely linked to mobility. Active choice can be mutual,
one-sided, or nonexistent.
Partner recognition: Recognition may be possible either because part-
ners have cognitive abilities that allow them to recognize partners individ-
ually, or because one or both partners show site fidelity. In the absence of
empirical evidence for the presence or absence of partner recognition (as is
the case for most systems), it may be more appropriate to ask, when
it seems feasible, whether or not partner recognition would yield advan-
tages. Advantages of partner recognition may be mutual, one-sided, or
nonexistent.
Behavioral options: Whenever individuals invest in their partner, they
are able to cooperate or to cheat and hence have the option to choose
between these two behaviors. If a player lacks the option to cheat in a sense
that would be meaningful (receiving benefits out of cheating the partner), it
is unconditionally cooperative. Options may be symmetrical in that both
partners can either cooperate or cheat [i.e., both are ‘‘conditional exploi-
ters’’ in Bronstein’s (2001b) terminology], or asymmetrical in that only one
partner has this strategic option. Finally, both players may lack the option
to cheat.
Investment: Players may or may not invest in their partner. As any
investment is by definition costly, we call the act of investing altruistic. If
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a player invests, this investment can be all or nothing (a player either
cooperates or cheats) or variable, in that individuals must decide precisely
how much they give to their partner.
Payoff symmetry: This parameter is quite specific in that it needs evalua-
tion only when both partners can cheat. In the absence of any quantitative
knowledge on exact payoff values for any mutualism, we distinguish be-
tween ‘‘asymmetric payoff values’’ (e.g., costs of being cheated are small for
one partner, but fatal for the other) and ‘‘symmetric payoff values,’’ in which
both partners appear to experience more or less similar costs of being
cheated. When only one partner can cheat, there is an obvious asymmetry.
In cases where neither partner can cheat, this parameter is not relevant.
Control over interaction: Partners may have ‘‘full control’’ over the inter-
action, in that they can withhold the reward/service that they are offering
without any costs, can steal the reward/service, or can force it to be handed
over. Both, one, or neither partner may have control over the interaction.
In the following section, we review the mutualism literature and report
on states of these 12 parameters for each of 8 well-studied forms of mutu-
alism. However, one must keep in mind that these 12 parameters still do not
represent the full complexity of mutualistic interactions. Each mutualistic
system may have its specific additional features that are important for a
thorough understanding of individual behavior (and hence the outcome of
the interaction). We list such additional features for each system as well.
VI. Evaluation of the Literature
We have organized our presentation of individual mutualisms according
to the three widely recognized classes of benefits mutualists receive: trans-
portation, protection, and nutrition (Boucher et al., 1982; Bronstein,
2001a). We briefly describe the important features of each system. To
facilitate comparison of the sections, we present the parameters in the
order in which they are listed in Table I.
A. Transportation Mutualisms
In transportation mutualisms, one partner offers the other a commodity,
usually food, in exchange for transport of itself or its gametes.
1. Pollination
In pollination mutualisms, plants offer a resource (usually nectar or
pollen as food) in exchange for transport of pollen and hence pollination
of the flowers. Most pollinator species are insects, but birds and mammals,
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especially bats and primates, may also function as pollinators. The crucial
issues about pollination mutualisms that game theory may be able to
address are why plant investment in nectar apparently does not usually
drop toward zero (it is well known that it has in some systems), and under
what conditions individuals of some species shift between pollination and
cheating (nectar-robbing) behaviors.
1. Dependency: Dependency can be mutually high, mutually low, or
asymmetric. Certain plants (not all: some are wind-pollinated) abso-
lutely require pollinators if they are to outbreed (although self-fertili-
zation may often be possible). Conversely, pollinators often rely
heavily or exclusively on floral resources as food. When specificity is
low, however, there may be very little dependency on a particular
partner species.
2. Specificity: Like dependency, specificity varies from mutually low
to mutually high to asymmetric. Certain plants can be pollinated only
by a single pollinator species that can obtain resources only from that
plant; some of these are discussed in the following section. Most
plant–pollinator interactions are considerably less specific than
this, however. An increasing number of pollination mutualisms are
being found to be distincly asymmetric in specificity (Va´zquez and
Simberloff, 2002).
3. N interactions: Interactions may be repeated or one-off. The situation
is sometimes more complex than this, however, as an individual
pollinator may interact only once with a particular flower but several
times with the same plant. Conversely, a plant may interact only once
with an individual pollinator, but with many individuals from a single
colony of Hymenoptera. Hence, the question arises whether one
should look at individual flowers or plants and at individual insects
or colonies.
4. Offer produced: Plants produce their offer prior to the interaction. In
contrast, pollinators make their offer during the interaction (they
deposit pollen, and/or collect pollen, in varying amounts) and after
the interaction (they may deposit the pollen they have collected on
conspecific flowers or heterospecific ones; in the latter case, the pollen
is wasted).
5. Moves: In principle, moves are sequential in that the plant puts out an
offer and then the pollinator decides whether or not to visit. This
simple view becomes complicated through the possibility that several
pollinators may visit the same flower, in which case the amount of
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nectar in a flower may partially reflect how much prior visitors left
behind rather than exactly what the plant offered.
6. Mobility: The pollinators are mobile, whereas plants are not.
7. Active choice: The pollinators can actively choose which plant/flower
to visit, whereas the plant has no control (in a behavioral sense) over
who visits. Flowers may have features that exclude certain pollinator
species or individuals of a certain size, shape, or behavior, but this
does not translate into active choice on the part of plants during the
course of an individual flower visit.
8. Partner recognition: If interactions are repeated, it may pay the
pollinator to recognize partners (‘‘site recognition’’). Indeed, certain
bees pheromone-mark flowers they have visited, and avoid revisiting
those flowers (e.g., Giurfa and Nunez, 1992).
9. Behavioral options: Pollinator species usually cooperate by default, as
they bring in pollen from plants visited previously for food, and pollen
is usually collected passively. However, there are certain pollinator
species in which individuals can choose to cheat by robbing nectar
without collecting or depositing pollen (Irwin et al., 2001), a strategy
that may save time. Conversely, plants may invest more or less energy
into the production of food for their pollinators, and low (or zero)
investment can be called cheating.
10. Investment: Whenever pollinators passively transfer and collect
pollen, questions about investment into the partner usually do not
apply. In species in which individuals can alternatively pollinate
or rob, investment in the mutualism is an all (visiting the regular
way and collecting/depositing pollen) or nothing (bypassing the
floral sexual organs to get directly to the nectar) phenomenon.
As mentioned above, investment of plants into their partners is
variable.
11. Payoff symmetry: In pollination interactions with passive pollen
transfer, cheating opportunities are asymmetric (only the plant can
reduce investment). When nectar robbing is possible, both partners
may cooperate or cheat. For a pollinator, being cheated by a single
flower probably inflicts little cost, although marking of empty flowers
and the ability to learn to avoid entirely nectarless plants suggests
that significant costs of fruitless visits must exist. Nectar robbing can
inflict costs to plants that range from high to low to nonexistent
(Maloof and Inouye, 2000).
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12. Control over interaction: Individual plants may control their invest-
ment into nectar at ecological time scales (Castellanos et al., 2002).
More generally, however, nectar production most likely reflects
evolutionary history and is thus quite inflexible. Some pollinators
may access the food source without pollinating. Some pollinators
may be able to preassess the food content of flowers and avoid empty
flowers. Except for the very few active pollination systems (see the
next section), they do not withhold pollen or avoid collecting pollen
if the flower is empty, although less pollen may be transferred if the
visit is shorter.
Important features of pollinator–plant mutualisms not covered by our
game structure assessment: (1) When pollinators have access to alternative
food sources, whether interacting with the flowering plants is beneficial
depends on the quality of these alternatives; (2) a pollinator may encounter
empty flowers not only because some plants invest little into nectar produc-
tion, but also because the flower may have been visited recently. The effect
on the pollinator is the same, however; and (3) whether interactions are
repeated or not may depend on how an interaction is defined. The two
crucial problems are whether an insect visiting multiple flowers of a single
plant during one inspection interacts repeatedly with the plant, and whether
plants pollinated by social insects interact with individual insects or with the
colony, in which more foragers may be recruited through communication.
2. Pollinating Seed Parasite Mutualisms
In this small subset of pollination mutualisms (reviewed by Dufay¨ and
Anstett, 2003), insects pollinate plants and simultaneously lay their eggs in
or near the flowers; the larvae eat some of the developing seeds. The fig–fig
wasp and yucca–yucca moth interactions are the best-known pollinating
seed parasite mutualisms, although several similar but independently
evolved interactions have been discovered. These include the senita cac-
tus–senita moth and globeflower–Chiastocheta fly interactions. The key
questions for these mutualisms include what limits the number of eggs laid
per female pollinator, how variation in population density of the pollina-
tors affects the mutualistic outcome, how plants can cope with destructively
high pollinator densities, and why a few of these plant species have evolved
mechanisms to (completely) prevent oviposition by the insects, while most
have not.
1. Dependency: These mutualisms are obligate for both partners. The
plants can be pollinated only by these insects, and the insects can lay
their eggs nowhere else.
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2. Specificity: The yucca, senita, and fig systems show very high specific-
ity, in that plant species and insect species are almost matched one to
one (but see Molbo et al., 2003). For Trollius, Chiastocheta flies
appear specific to a particular plant species, while the plant may be
pollinated by several species of Chiastocheta.
3. N interactions: Interactions are usually one-off between fig wasps and
figs, since an inflorescence is usually visited only once by an individual
insect. However, in other pollinating seed parasite mutualisms, indi-
vidual insects will visit more than one inflorescence on the same or on
different plants.
4. Offer produced: As in other pollination mutualisms, plants produce
their offer (an oviposition site, in this case) prior to the interaction,
while the insects provide their offer during the interaction. The in-
sects’ offer has a benefit component and a cost component: (a) how
many flowers they pollinate, and (b) how many eggs they lay.
5. Moves: Moves are sequential: first the flower makes an offer, then the
insect makes hers. Plants may make a further move later, through
random (senita) or selective (yucca) fruit abortion (Holland et al.,
2004).
6. Mobility: Plants are immobile, and the insects visit them.
7. Active choice: This varies across different pollinating seed parasite
mutualisms. Fig wasps apparently do not compare among inflores-
cences; they may enter the first one that they encounter. In the
process, they lose their wings and rarely leave. Thus, the wasps are
unlikely to exert active choice at the level of the inflorescence (it is
possible that they do make choices among flowers within it, however).
In contrast, yucca moths, senita moths, and Chiastocheta flies visit
several flowers, and at least have the potential to make choices among
them.
8. Partner recognition: Partner recognition is unlikely to play a role in
these mutualisms, although in some cases (e.g., Huth and Pellmyr,
1999), the insect has mechanisms to avoid visiting the same flower
twice.
9. Behavioral options: The plants have limited options to cheat their
pollinators, although some yuccas may kill the offspring of pollinators
before they begin to feed (Bao and Addicott, 1998) and female fig
trees (in the dioecious fig species) prevent fig wasp oviposition and
thus obtain the benefits of pollination without paying a cost for it. The
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insects can cheat in two possible ways: (a) they may not pollinate, and
(b) they may lay more eggs than average.
10. Investment: In the dioecious fig species, cheating is all or nothing:
female trees prevent fig wasp oviposition while males allow it (Kjell-
berg et al., 1987). Insects show variable investment, which could be
expressed as the ratio of pollinating acts to eggs laid.
11. Payoff symmetry: In systems in which the plant cannot cheat, the
strategy set is asymmetric in that only the insect can cheat (hence the
payoff matrix is asymmetric). In the dioecious fig species, where both
individual plants and insects may cheat, the payoffs are asymmetric,
in that the trees (which reproduce many times in their lives) would
lose little from a wasp that cheated, while the wasp dies without
reproducing if it enters an inflorescence on a female fig tree.
12. Control over interaction: The pollinators have full control over the
interaction, in that they come to the plant and set the conditions of
the game by deciding how many flowers to pollinate and how many
eggs to lay. Plants may have morphological adaptations that make
ovipositing in some flowers more difficult.
Important features of pollinating seed parasite mutualisms not covered by
our game structure assessment: (1) Fig trees and yuccas make many flowers
in each reproductive episode, whereas Trollius usually bears only a single
flower at a time; (2) all plants have multiple reproductive episodes, whereas
the insects have only one; (3) Trollius also offers nectar, not only oviposi-
tion space, for its mutualists. Hence, male as well as female flies visit the
flowers, and may in fact be responsible for most of the pollination
(Despre´s, 2003); (4) fig wasps collect and move the pollen in the inflores-
cence in which they develop. Any emerging female wasp thus contributes
to the fitness of the very same tree whose female function was reduced by
the larval seed predators. In contrast, other pollinating seed parasites do
not collect pollen from the flower in which they matured (Addicott et al.,
1990); (5) there is a temporal component to how cooperative the pollina-
tors are that has nothing to do with the pollinators’ behavioral strategies
(Law et al., 2001). The first individual to arrive at a flower must cooperate
by pollinating, or else her offspring will starve (unless a second female visits
and pollinates). Later female visitors may not contribute much more to
plant fitness, as pollination has already occurred and may be sufficient to
permit initiation of every seed (Bronstein, 2001c); however, they may lay
some additional eggs, which decreases plant fitness; and (6) plants may
abort fruits, either selectively (ones with many eggs; yucca) or unselectively
(senita). This means that although plants cannot control directly what
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insects are doing (see point 12; control over interaction), they may respond
to insect behavior at later stages.
3. Seed Dispersal
In these mutualisms, plants provide food in exchange for transport of
seeds (reviewed by Herrera, 2002). Typical seed dispersers are birds, mam-
mals, and ants. The plant benefits from the great mobility of the fruit/seed
consumer that results in seeds being removed from the maternal plant.
Seeds are sometimes moved long distances and/or to superior germination
spots. The animal gets a meal in return. With respect to this article, the
major goal is to understand what factors determine plant investment in
fruit flesh.
1. Dependency: Partners are moderately dependent on each other. Plants
may require seed dispersal for their seeds to have any chance to
germinate, although undispersed seeds may have a low likelihood of
success. Most disperser species have a wide range of food sources,
although at certain times of year they may be heavily dependent on
fruit.
2. Specificity: Specificity is generally low. Certain plants may rely on a
given class of animals as seed dispersers (e.g., small birds, or seed-
harvesting ants), but in only very rare cases is specificity higher than
this. Similarly, almost no animals rely on fruits of a single species for
food.
3. N interactions: Interactions may often be repeated but could also be
one-off: an individual fruit usually has only a single interaction—the
interaction in which it gets eaten. But almost all plants bear multiple
ripe fruits at once, and most animals visit the same plant repeatedly
for food.
4. Offer produced: The plants produce their offer prior to the interaction,
whereas the seed dispersers produce theirs during the interaction (when
they select a fruit) and afterward (when they drop or defecate the seeds).
5. Moves: Moves may be termed sequential (first the plant, then the seed
disperser makes a move).
6. Mobility: The plants are sessile, whereas the dispersers are mobile.
7. Active choice: The plant cannot choose (in a behavioral sense) who
eats the fruits, although, as in plant–pollinator interactions, selection
may have shaped the subset of animals that are attracted to and
rewarded by the fruit. Seed dispersers have the potential to compare
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and actively choose among several plants, although the extent to
which they actually do so is little known.
8. Partner recognition: Plants lack this ability, whereas the seed disper-
sers have the potential to remember plants with large fruit crops and
with fruits in the correct stage of ripeness.
9. Behavioral options: Plants could potentially cheat by reducing their
effort in the production of fruit flesh. Seed dispersers would appear to
lack the option to cheat.
10. Investment: Investment of the plants is variable; among other things,
it depends on the ratio of fruit flesh to seeds. Seed disperser species
do not invest in the interaction; presumably, they defecate whenever
they must.
11. Payoff symmetry: As only the plant invests, the question of how
mutual cheating affects each partner’s fitness does not apply. For
the dispersers, picking fruits with little flesh probably bears little cost.
12. Control over interaction: The seed dispersers have full control, in
that they choose the fruits they prefer. Plants would appear to have
little control over where the seed disperser will defecate, although
the recent discovery of laxatives in certain fruits (Murray et al., 1994)
suggests some control over when they will do so (and, hence, where
they may be when they defecate).
B. Protection Mutualisms
In this category of mutualisms, one species offers its partner some form
of protection from the abiotic environment or natural enemies. In return,
the other partner receives either a food reward (e.g., in cleaning and ant
protection mutualisms) or reciprocal protection (in group foraging and
Mu¨llerian mimicry associations).
1. Cleaning Mutualism
In cleaning mutualisms, a ‘‘cleaner’’ species benefits by obtaining access
to a food source, while a ‘‘client’’ species has its ectoparasites and possibly
dead or infected tissue removed (see reviews by Coˆte´, 2000; Losey et al.,
1999). Cleaning mutualisms involve a very diverse group of animals. On the
cleaner side, there are shrimps, fish, and birds. Clients can be fish, turtles,
crocodiles, and various mammals. The key questions in understanding
cleaning mutualisms are how the conflict between cleaner and client over
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what the cleaner should eat is resolved, and how cleaners avoid being eaten
by predatory clients.
With respect to our parameters, cleaning mutualisms have the following
features.
1. Dependency: Clients generally show low dependency, in that they
survive long periods without being cleaned. Most cleaner species
described so far are also relatively independent of their clients in that
they eat plenty of alternative food items under natural conditions.
However, a few cleaner fish of the genus Labroides and Elacatinus,
and possibly some shrimp species, accrue 80% or more of their diet
from cleaning interaction (Coˆte´, 2000).
2. Specificity: Partner species usually show very low specificity: each
cleaner species interacts with several client species and vice versa
(although clients are less specific to cleaners than cleaners are to
clients).
3. N interactions: Depending on the home range sizes of the pair of
species involved, interactions between individuals can be repeated or
one-off.
4. Offer produced: Offers are produced during the interaction. Neither
cleaner nor client can preassess how its partner will behave. The cleaner
‘‘produces’’ a certain level of service (i.e., parasite removal) during
the interaction; similarly, during the interaction, the client makes a
decision on how long to interact with the cleaner, and in the case of
predatory clients whether it will try to eat it.
5. Moves: Moves are made simultaneously.
6. Mobility: Cleaner shrimps and some cleaner fish show very limited
mobility, while other cleaner fish and birds are quite mobile. Similar-
ly, there is great variation among client species in their mobility.
7. Active choice: The relatively immobile cleaner shrimps and fish men-
tioned above lack the option to actively visit clients and start interac-
tions. Nevertheless, they are sometimes able to choose, when two or
more clients seek their service simultaneously. Similarly, client spe-
cies with small home ranges or territories usually have at best access
to one cleaning station and hence cannot choose between cleaners
unless they have cleaner fish and cleaner shrimp present, which hap-
pens occasionally (R. Bshary, unpublished observation). Cleaner spe-
cies and client species with large home ranges, however, are in a
position to actively seek the partners they prefer.
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8. Partner recognition: Individual recognition of clients has been shown
experimentally for the cleaner wrasse Labroides dimidiatus (Tebbich
et al., 2002). In this system and in some other cases, individual clea-
ners show strong site fidelity and hence may be recognized through
location. Generally, individual recognition would be advantageous if
the partners have the option to cheat and if interactions are repeated.
9. Behavioral options: It is known for some cleaner fish and bird species
that they can cheat the clients by feeding on healthy client tissue
(Randall, 1958; Weeks, 2000). Cleaner shrimps may lack this option,
but this remains to be confirmed. Two categories of clients need
to be distinguished (Bshary, 2001). Clients that are potential preda-
tors of their cleaners could cheat by eating their cleaner, whereas
nonpredatory clients have no means to exploit a cleaner.
10. Investment: The investment of cleaners with cheating abilities into
their clients is variable (in the sense that the rate of cheating bites to
cooperative bites is variable). The investment of predators is all or
nothing: they either cooperate or try to eat the cleaner.
11. Payoff symmetry: In most cases, only the cleaner is able to cheat,
hence the payoff matrix is asymmetric. An exception are interactions
between cleaners with cheating abilities and predatory clients. Here,
the payoffs are asymmetric, as a cheated predator would lose a bit of
healthy tissue while the cleaner would lose its life.
12. Control over interaction: Cleaners have full control over the service
quality they provide. Clients can only respond to cleaner fish behav-
ior. Nevertheless, most client species have high control, in that they
can terminate interactions immediately whenever they decide to.
However, some species may move slowly relative to cleaners and
therefore have difficulties avoiding a cleaner that wants to interact
with them.
Important features of cleaning mutualisms not covered by our game
structure assessment: (1) The benefits that cleaners can offer to the clients
depend critically on the population dynamics of other species, namely the
parasites. If parasite abundance is low, cleaners cannot provide great
benefits to their clients (Grutter, 1997); and (2) cleaner-to-client ratios
may determine whether or not cleaners get sufficient food from their
interactions with clients. If cleaners are very abundant, facultative cleaners
might switch to other food sources, while full-time cleaners may cheat
more frequently by feeding on healthy client tissue. Finally, territorial
clients might face significant costs when visiting cleaning stations means
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leaving their territory, due to risk of territory loss and aggression by
conspecifics (Cheney and Coˆte´, 2001).
2. Ant Protection Mutualisms
In these mutualisms, ants provide protection against natural enemies,
while the partners provide a food source, and in certain cases, shelter. Well-
studied examples include mutualisms between ants and lycaenid caterpil-
lars (Pierce et al., 2002), ants and a variety of Homoptera, including aphids
and treehoppers (Buckley, 1987), and ants and plants (Heil and McKey,
2003). Protection results either when ants chase away predators/herbivores,
or when they actively consume them. Food sources include excretions (in
the case of aphids), glandular secretions (lycaenids), and extrafloral nectar
and lipid-rich food bodies (plants). The key questions for understanding
ant protection mutualisms are why ants protect their partners at all, why
insect mutualists are not eaten by the ants, and what keeps the production
of food and shelter by the tended partners as high as it is.
1. Dependency: There is a continuum of dependence, from species that
cannot survive unless ant tended, to species whose success is only
marginally increased by tending. Ants usually have food sources in
addition to what they receive from their partners. Only in certain
highly specialized ant–‘‘myrmecophytic’’ plant mutualisms (e.g., the
association between neotropical Acacia species and Pseudomyrmex
ants) are the ants highly dependent on their partners.
2. Specificity: Ants and myrmecophytic plants, as well as ants and some
lycaenid species, form relatively species-specific relationships; speci-
ficity in most other ant protection systems is low.
3. N interactions: Individuals interact repeatedly with each other.
4. Offer produced: Offers are generally produced continuously during
the interaction, although partners in need of protection may produce
an initial offer before ants are present, in order to attract them.
5. Moves: It is difficult to apply the terms ‘‘simultaneous’’ or ‘‘sequen-
tial’’ to ant protection mutualisms. The partner species continually
invest in the ants by providing food, although they may modulate the
amount and quality in relation to their need for protection. Ants, on
the other hand, do not do anything beneficial for their partners most
of the time. Benefits accrue only when the partner is at risk of attack.
6. Mobility: Partner species move little or not at all, while the ants are
generally highly mobile. Exceptions are ant species associated with
myrmecophytic plants that occupy nest space on or in the plant.
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Hence, they have strongly reduced mobility compared with most ant
protectors.
7. Active choice: The tended species appear to have no ability for active
choice, while ants usually have access to several partners. Again, the
exceptions are ant species associated with myrmecophytic plants.
Here, the ant queen could initially choose a plant on which to settle,
but once the colony grows, movement to other plants and hence the
ability to actively choose among partners may be constrained.
8. Partner recognition: Ants may be able to recognize individual part-
ners through site recognition (mediated via trail-marking phero-
mones), since most ant-protected species are immobile or nearly so.
Partners seem highly unlikely to be able to recognize individual ants.
9. Behavioral options: Ants could in principle cooperate or cheat, in one
of two ways: they could avoid risks associated with defending their
partners, or they could actively consume them (relevant for Homo-
ptera and some lycaenid species). Tended partners may cheat by
reducing the amount or quality of food or shelter that they provide
to ants. This option is limited in aphids, as aphids honeydew is mainly
an excretion that cannot be stopped completely.
10. Investment: Investment is usually variable on both sides of the
interaction: both protection effort and food production can be ad-
justed (with the possible exception of Homoptera). In the case of
possible ant predation of partners, investment is all or nothing.
11. Payoff symmetry: The effects of reduced investment in the partner
are asymmetrical in ant–insect protection. If ants do not defend,
predators/parasites can kill the insect, whereas ants just lose a bit
of food if cheated. The payoffs are more symmetrical in ant–plant
mutualisms, since the cost of lack of defense by a single ant individ-
ual is a marginally higher rate of herbivory for the plant rather than a
matter of life and death.
12. Control over interaction: Ants usually have full control over their
own behavior: they can presumably choose how much protection
they give, and they can quickly adjust to environmental conditions.
Tended partners could in principle control to some extent how much
food they offer; Homoptera may have limited control over what they
offer, although there is some evidence that they control its chemistry
(Fischer and Shingleton, 2001). A major problem might be that
tended partners cannot respond instantaneously to changes in their
most important variable in the environment, namely predator attack.
21
However, the ability of lycaenids to alter secretion rates according to
their perceived need for protection, and of some lycaenids and plants
to increase secretion on attack, may reduce subsequent attack rates
(Axe´n et al., 1996; Leimar and Axe´n, 1993; Ness, 2003).
Important features of ant protection mutualisms not covered by our game
structure assessment: (1) Most importantly, the magnitude of the benefits
ants can offer to their partners depends crucially on the identity and
density of the partners’ natural enemies. If there are no enemies, ant
tending may confer no benefit (but see Morales, 2000); and (2) the benefits
that the partner species provide depend on the identity and quality of
alternative food sources available to the ants. Under some circumstances,
partner species may not be able to provide food of high enough quality to
make tending a profitable option for ants.
3. Mixed Species Aggregations
Individuals or groups of different species of vertebrates aggregate for
some or all of their lives. Detailed studies have investigated mixed species
associations in forest primates (Ho¨ner et al., 1997), ungulates (FitzGibbon,
1990), a large variety of bird species (Moynihan, 1962), and fish (Ehrlich
and Ehrlich, 1973). For most of these interspecific associations, it is as-
sumed that a reduction in predation risk is the primary advantage. There is
good evidence for this claim in birds and mammals (Bshary and Noe¨, 1997;
Fitzgibbon, 1990; Greig-Smith, 1981; Noe¨ and Bshary, 1997). Potential
mechanisms facilitating increased protection include dilution effects, con-
fusion effects, increased early warning, and improved defense. Increasing
group size with allospecifics rather than conspecifics may reduce competi-
tion over food or mating partners. It may also lead to the joining of
complementary skills in predator avoidance, or may reduce predation risk
if the partner species is ‘‘preferred’’ by predators (references in Noe¨ and
Bshary, 1997). Increased foraging efficiency for individuals of one or
both partner species is an alternative hypothesis to explain mixed species
associations (references in Cords, 1987).
1. Dependency: Dependency in these associations is probably low, and
each species could survive without its partner. Nevertheless, there will
often be an asymmetry, in that one partner species benefits more from
the association than the other partner species.
2. Specificity: Associations can be quite partner specific (e.g., olive colobus
seek Diana monkeys at Tiwai Island; Whitesides, 1989). Often, however,
several partner species are involved in the association. Still, some species
may be better partner species than others because of their vigilance
abilities, active predator defense, or passive food provisioning.
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3. N interactions: Interactions are usually repeated between the
same individuals or groups. In some bird flocks or fish schools,
individuals may only meet once, although this has rarely been
documented.
4. Offer produced: Offers here mean that (a) the presence of each
individual adds to the safety for all other individuals through early
warning, dilution, or confusion effects, and (b) one partner species
facilitates access to a food source for the other one in association when
foraging benefits exist. Offers are produced during the interaction.
5. Moves: This term is difficult to apply to interspecific associations.
Moves may be termed simultaneous in that everybody responds to
the presence of a predator. If access to food is traded for increased
protection (as possibly in some marine associations), food may be
accessed continuously while predatory attacks are unpredictable.
6. Mobility: Partners are generally mobile.
7. Active choice: Because of their mobility, individuals may often be able to
actively choose with whom to associate. Territoriality and living in stable
groups may constrain active choice options in some species, however.
8. Partner recognition: Partner recognition below the species or some-
times group level appears not to be necessary unless it can be shown
that cheating the partner species is a problem in interspecific interac-
tions (see below).
9. Behavioral options: Cheating appears not to be an option within these
interactions. The benefits of mixed species associations are usually an
emergent property of the increase in group size: improved early
detection of predators due to ‘‘many eyes and ears,’’ dilution effects,
and confusion effects. Note, however, that there may be individual
differences with respect to the likelihood of giving alarm calls, al-
though these differences are seen as intraspecific strategies (Sherman,
1977).
10. Investment: There is no investment that benefits the partner directly,
although there are costs of staying together and synchronizing activity
patterns.
11. Payoff symmetry: As there is no cheating, the payoff symmetry is of
no concern.
12. Control over interaction: As mentioned above, the benefits are a result
of simply associating together. No active exchange between partners
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occurs. Hence, every participating partner gets the increased
protection by default.
Important feature of mixed species associations not covered by our assess-
ment of game structures: The costs and benefits of mixed species associa-
tions depend on group size. Costs of being in a group larger than some
optimal level cannot be attributed to the behavior of individuals. Indivi-
duals do not cheat, but competition for food increases with the number of
individuals present. Population densities may hence become a crucial
parameter.
4. Mu¨llerian Mimicry
In Mu¨llerian mimicry, two or more partner species (1) strongly resemble
each other in colors and morphology, and (2) are to some degree unpalat-
able or poisonous (Ruxton et al., 2004; Speed, 1999). Individuals of partner
species do not interact directly with each other. On exposure to the same
potential predator species, look-alikes benefit from the dilution effects
associated with individual predators learning to avoid prey with certain
characteristics (color, smell). The best-studied Mu¨llerian mimicry
complexes involve Lepidoptera. The crucial question is what pre-
vents individuals of partner species from reducing the unpalatable or
poisonous products in their body and becoming Batesian mimics that
resemble unpalatable species but are harmless.
1. Dependency: Dependency is probably mutually low: each species can
survive without the partner species, although fitness may be higher in
its presence.
2. Specificity: All species that resemble each other, are unpalatable, and
occur in the same place should be good partners. The number of
partner species may therefore range from one to many.
3. N interactions: Individuals do not interact directly with each other.
Potential predators, however, may repeatedly interact with (i.e.,
encounter) individuals of all species involved.
4. Offer produced: Nothing is exchanged between mimicry species.
Hence, the ‘‘offer,’’ if it can be said to exist at all, is the degree of
unpalatability, which is produced continuously.
5. Moves: This parameter is difficult to apply to Mu¨llerian mimicry.
Moves can be termed simultaneous in that all individuals involved
may be encountered by a predator at any time.
6. Mobility: Partner species are mobile.
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7. Active choice: There is usually no potential for active choice in
Mu¨llerian mimicry, since mimics do not appear to intentionally flock
together.
8. Partner recognition: Partners do not need to recognize each other in
order to share benefits, and it is unlikely that they do.
9. Behavioral options: The crucial questions are whether (a) the unpalat-
able substances are costly to produce, and (b) if they are costly, wheth-
er the exact investment of individuals depends critically on what
individuals of partner species do rather than on what conspecifics do.
For example, kin selection and low dispersal rates may stabilize unpal-
atability independently of the existence of a Mu¨llerian look-alike. If
the answer to both questions is ‘‘yes,’’ then cheating is possible. With
respect to production, there is evidence in some systems that seques-
tering secondary compounds from food is costly (Ruxton et al., 2004).
10. Investment: If unpalatability is costly, investment is variable in that
the production or incorporation of compounds is variable. But as
mentioned above, it is critical to know whether investment is a game
between conspecifics or between all look-alikes.
11. Payoff symmetry: The payoffs should be symmetrical, as costs and
benefits to each partner are similar.
12. Control over interaction: Individuals do not directly interact with
each other. Each individual may control to some extent its produc-
tion or sequestration of toxic compounds; however, it has no control
over what other individuals are doing.
Important features of Mullerian mimicry not covered by our assessment of
game structures: (1) Population densities of partners may be crucial to
understand how a reduction in unpalatability in one species would affect
predator behavior and hence the fitness of all Mu¨llerian mimic species; and
(2) as mentioned above, dispersal patterns might be another important
variable. If dispersal rates are low, then kin selection advantages associated
with predator defense may override any advantages of reduced investment.
In contrast, if dispersal rates are high, a reduction in investment may be
advantageous.
C. Nutrition Mutualisms
Until this point, we have focused on nonsymbiotic mutualisms, simply
because more relevant ecological data are available to infer their
game structures. In this section, we deal relatively briefly with a suite of
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mutualistic symbioses based on the benefit of nutrition (reviewed by Dou-
glas, 1994): nitrogen-fixing symbioses, plant–mycorrhizal mutualisms, cor-
al–zooxanthellae associations, and lichens (mutualistic symbioses between
fungus and algae). In these interactions, one partner acts as host to a
microbial associate that lives in or on it. The two partners trade substances
that are either of nutritional value or essential for physiological activities.
Shelter offered by the host may be an additional offer. The crucial question
in symbioses is how the nutrient transfer between partners is regulated. We
stress that our parameter descriptions below are somewhat conjectural, in
light of limited study of some of the critical features of these interactions.
1. Dependency: In most cases, hosts are highly dependent for survival
and/or growth on their symbionts. Certain symbiont species are
known to occur only in association with hosts, but in general,
information is lacking on this point.
2. Specificity: While it was once assumed that nutritional symbioses ex-
hibit low partner specificity, more recent molecular evidence suggests
higher or even complete specificity, at least in vertically transmitted
symbioses (Herre et al., 1999).
3. N interactions: There is usually one prolonged interaction between
individual partners during which partners may alter their behavior
repeatedly. From a theoretical point of view, the interaction can
therefore be seen as repeated. On the brief end, some corals readjust
the number of algae on a daily basis; on the long end, the interactions
last a lifetime in lichens. Things become even more complex as
there can be long-term associations between cell lineages, not just
individuals.
4. Offer produced: Offers are produced continuously by both partners.
Hosts sometimes must invest first, however, by producing a structure
in which the symbiont can live.
5. Moves: Moves are simultaneous, and both partners may continuously
provide nutrients to each other.
6. Mobility: In many symbioses, both partners are sessile and cannot
move freely. Zooxanthellae, however, move in the water column.
7. Active choice: There is no choice possible in vertically transmitted
symbioses (i.e., those passed internally between host generations).
With regard to horizontally transmitted symbioses, at least some
marine symbionts actively locate hosts, usually via chemical detection
(Douglas, 1994).
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8. Partner recognition: In this context, partner recognition refers to
being able to assess the amount of nutrient received from different
partners. Partner recognition of some form would be advantageous in
all cases in which one individual interacts with several partner indivi-
duals, especially hosts associated with several symbiont lineages that
may confer greater or lesser benefits. In mycorrhizae, an individual
fungal genotype may be in contact simultaneously with several plants;
in this case, both partners could benefit from partner recognition.
9. Behavioral options: Both sides invest in their partner, so both sides
can in principle cooperate or cheat. A variety of forms of cheating
have in fact been detected in both hosts and symbionts (e.g., Kiers
et al., 2003; Smith and Smith, 1996).
10. Investment: The investment into the partner is variable rather than
all or nothing.
11. Payoff symmetry: The payoffs may be relatively symmetrical in most
systems, as being cheated usually means not receiving nutrients from
the partner. However, being cheated may have greater consequences
for a unicellular symbiont compared with its multicellular host. The
payoffs in corals can also be asymmetric, as some polyps can eat their
zooxanthellae.
12. Control over interaction: This point is of crucial importance for the
outcome of the game, but is still unresolved. In corals, it is hypothe-
sized that polyps have some control over nutrient flow, as the algae are
placed into a host vacuole. Polyps may also expel the algae (Titlyanov
et al., 1996). In nitrogen-fixing symbioses, plants must offer an initial
investment that may or may not be reciprocated later on. During
later stages of the interactions, evidence suggests that there is a
complex amino acid transfer between plant and rhizobia that pre-
vents either partner from dominating the interaction (Kiers et al.,
2003; Lodwig et al., 2003). Such information is essential for all
symbioses. We need to know how well each partner can control
how much it gives and how much its partner has to give in return.
Important features of nutritional symbioses not covered by our game
structure assessment: (1) There is one important variable that exists only
in symbioses: do partners associate horizontally or vertically? Vertical
transmission of symbionts has been shown empirically and theoretically
to reduce the potential for conflict among partners; and (2) Hosts
and symbionts usually have radically different generation times. How
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generation times affect the outcome of interactions at evolutionary time
scales has barely been addressed (Bergstrom and Lachmann, 2003).
VII. How Similar/Different Are Mutualisms?
In the previous section, we reviewed the best-studied mutualistic sys-
tems in order to extract their game structures. A summary of our results
is presented in Table II. We now attempt to assess the similarities
between these interactions in the context of game structure. The impor-
tance of ecology for our understanding of behavioral strategies and their
consequences on the fitness of each partner are evaluated later.
One might expect that the huge diversity mutualisms exhibit with respect
to evolutionary origin, species identity, and ecology would also be reflected
in game structures. If so, it is likely that general principles cannot be found.
We promote a more optimistic view, based on the game theoretic concepts
that we presented in Section I. These concepts focus on the question of how
mutualistic systems may be stable against erosion through the evolution of
cheating strategies. Below, we review the main features of game structure
that mutualisms share, even when differing greatly in natural history.
A. Investment
In the majority of mutualistic systems investigated in this article, one or
both partners invest in each other. In most cases, investment is variable;
for example, plants may produce greater or lesser amounts of nectar
per flower, and pollinators may deposit and carry a variable number of
pollen grains between plants. Exceptions are protectors and clients that can
act as predators of their partners. In these cases, individual investment may
be all or nothing (i.e., the partner is either allowed to live or is eaten), as
the original prisoner’s dilemma game assumed (Axelrod and Hamilton,
1981). However, cheating by predators terminates the game and hence
violates the iterated prisoner’s dilemma game in another important way
(Hammerstein and Hoekstra, 1995). For all mutualisms in which invest-
ment occurs, one can ask what factors may stabilize cooperative behavior
by disfavoring individuals that play a strategy of reduced investment in the
partner.
In other mutualisms, however, there appears to be no investment
whatsoever. In particular, in mixed-species foraging associations, mutual
benefits appear to be a simple by-product of group enlargement. Many
other, less well-studied mutualisms similarly involve no investment. Exam-
ples include gabar goshawks placing webs with social spiders into their nest
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TABLE II
Summary of Evaluated Parameters That May Have Important Implications for the Outcome of Interspecific Interactionsa
Parameter
Plant–
pollinator
Plant–seed
parasites
Plant–seed
dispersers
Cleaner–
client
Ants–
partner
Mixed
species Mimicry
Host–
symbiont
Dependency High/div High/high Low/low Div/low Div/div Low/low Low/low High/high
Specificity Low/low High/high Low/low Low/low Div/div Variable Variable Often high
N interactions Variable One-off Variable Variable Repeated Repeated d n a Lasting
Offer
produced
Before/
during
Before/
during
Before/
after
During/
during
During/
during
During/
during
Constant/
constant
During/
during
Moves Seq Seq Seq Simult Simult Simult Simult Simult
Mobility No/yes No/yes No/yes Var/var Var/no Yes/yes Yes/yes No/var
Active choice No/yes No/var No/yes Var/var Var/no Both d n a No/no
Partner
recognition
No/var No-pos/no No/pos Var/var Pos/no Pos or no No/no Pos/no
Behavioral
options
cd/cd or c cd/cd cd/c cd or c/cd
or c
cd/cd c/c cd or c/cd
or c
cd/cd
Investment Cont/a–n Cont,
a–n/cont
Cont/no Cont/a–n Cont,
a–n/cont
No/no Cont/cont Cont/cont
Payoff
symmetry
Sym Life-din d n a Life–din Sym or
life–din
d n a Sym Sym or
life–din
Control Var/full No/var No/full Full/var Full/var Full/full Full/full ?/?
aIf two parameter states are given, separated by ‘‘/,’’ the first information applies to the mutualist named first in row 1, and the second
information applies to the mutualist named second in row 1. For example, in plant–pollinator mutualisms, dependency is high for the plants and
diverse for the pollinators (some species are highly dependent whereas others are not). Abbreviations: div, diverse parameter states occur in the
system; d n a, does not apply; simult, simultaneous; seq, sequential; pos, possible (the ability would yield fitness advantages); c, to cooperate is the
only behavioral option; cd, individuals could cooperate or cheat, at least in theory; cont, continuous; a–n, all or nothing; life–din: one partner would
lose little if cheated whereas the other partner would lose its life; sym, symmetrical; var, variable.
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to reduce parasite densities on young (Henschel et al., 1992) and coopera-
tive hunting between groupers and moray eels (Bshary et al., 2001). Since
there is no (or minimal) investment, there is presumably nothing for these
species to gain by cheating in the interaction; in fact, it is difficult even to
define what cheating would consist of. There can be opportunity costs in
these systems, that is groupers may spend a considerable amount of time
(up to 60 min; R. Bshary, unpublished observation) signalling to the moray
eel, trying to elicit joint hunting. But these costs do not translate into
benefits for the moray eel. We do not deal with these mutualisms further
in this article, as game theory does not appear to have much to offer as a
tool to study their stability. Furthermore, we cannot discuss Mu¨llerian
mimicry examples properly without knowing whether or not there is selec-
tion on partner species to become palatable Batesian mimics. In any case,
individuals of partner species do not invest in each other in interactions and
hence our game structures do not yield important insights.
B. Investment at the Outset of the Interaction
In a diverse range of mutualisms, one partner may have to produce an
initial investment for the interaction to begin. Some species must produce a
reward in order to attract a partner, including plants (floral nectar, extra-
floral nectar, and fruits) and lycaenid caterpillars (secretions). Other mu-
tualisms are only initiated once one partner has produced a shelter for the
other to inhabit (e.g., myrmecophytic plants and reef-building corals).
Finally, the cleaner wrasse L. dimidiatus must invest initially in its resident
clients by providing tactile stimulation before it is allowed to search each
client’s surface for parasites (Bshary, 2002). In all these cases, any potential
benefit for the investing partner is delayed until after substantial invest-
ment has been made. Hence, the question of when the other partners will
cheat by taking the offer without returning any benefits becomes particu-
larly interesting. Such behaviors are well documented in most of these
mutualisms. For example, nectar robbers take floral nectar while bypassing
the pollen and stigmas; it is difficult to see how plants could sanction these
behaviors in a behavioral sense.
C. Partner Choice
A common feature of mutualisms (with the exception of mutualistic sym-
bioses involving vertical transmission) is that individuals of one species may
have, at least theoretically, the option to choose among several individuals of
their partner species. Pollinators and seed dispersers are usually mobile and
visit several plants, many clients are mobile and visit different cleaner indivi-
duals, and ants tend a variety of individual partners, often belonging to several
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partner species. In all these systems, the predictions of biological market
theory (Hoeksema and Schwartz, 2001, 2003; Noe¨, 2001; Noe¨ and
Hammerstein, 1994; Noe¨ et al., 1991) could be tested. Biological market
theory treats mutualistic interactions as an exchange of goods between
partners that differ in the degree of control they have over the goods they
trade. Predictions based on market theory would be as follows. (1) The
chosen partner species adjust their offers according to supply and demand
ratios. If they have few competitors for access to partners, they should offer
less than if there are many competitors, because in the latter situation,
individuals of the partner species can be choosy; and (2) individuals of the
choosy partner species should stop interacting with cheating individuals
and search for more cooperative partners. Such active choice would stabi-
lize the occurrence of cooperative behavior in the partner species (Ferrie`re
et al., 2002). In one marine cleaning mutualism, Bshary and Scha¨ffer (2002)
found that client species with large home ranges do choose between clea-
ners on the basis of the quality of the service that cleaners provide. More
specifically, clients switch to a new cleaner if they are bitten by their
current one, and return with high probability if the cleaner behaves coop-
eratively (Bshary and Scha¨ffer, 2002). In addition, partner choice options
may affect an array of other parameters, at least in the L. dimidiatus
cleaning mutualism (Bshary and Noe¨, 2003). However, evidence that choo-
siness of clients stabilizes cooperative behavior of cleaners is still lacking.
While individuals need to move freely in order to be able to actively
choose between potential partners, there is also a way of choosing that may
be called ‘‘passive.’’ For example, in most mutualistic symbioses, each host
interacts simultaneously with several genetically distinct symbiont lineages.
If these symbionts vary in quality, any ability of the host to sanction
unproductive symbionts would be favored by natural selection. Evidence
in nitrogen-fixing symbioses between plants and Rhizobium bacteria shows
that plants do in fact discriminate between nodules with different N2
production (Kiers et al., 2003; Lodwig et al., 2003). Similarly, some yucca
plants selectively abort fruits that contain high numbers of pollinator eggs
(Pellmyr and Huth, 1994). Like active choice, this passive choice arguably
stabilizes cooperative behavior of the symbionts. Similar ‘‘sanctions’’ have
been argued to exist in some other mutualisms as well (e.g., West et al.,
2002).
D. Dependency and Specificity
Dependency on the partner is typically high in nutritional symbioses,
pollinating seed parasite mutualisms, and interactions between ants and
myrmecophytic plants. In addition, a few cleaner species and many plants
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can survive or reproduce only when clients/pollinators visit them. Interest-
ingly, high dependency does not necessarily translate into high partner
specificity. In particular, cleaner fish and shrimps access many client spe-
cies, and many self-incompatible plants can be pollinated by a wide range
of small insects. On the other hand, partner specificity may be high in some
mixed species and mimicry associations, although dependency is probably
relatively low in these cases.
Dependency appears to be a parameter that may affect mutualistic
interactions in ways that go beyond the game structures we presented.
With respect to game structures, dependency may simply affect payoff
values: if one partner is very dependent on the other, the payoff values
for receiving a cooperative act from the partner are higher if an individual
is critically dependent on the partner’s cooperation than if the individ-
ual can survive well without the partner. But the degree of dependency
may also affect interactions more deeply, through increased selection
pressure favoring mutants with greater access to resources provided by
the partner. The result can be seen as increased sophistication of behavior-
al strategies, but also as potential threats to the evolutionary persistence of
cooperative behavior, as the following examples indicate: (1) only obligate
cleaners of the genus Labroides are known to manipulate client decisions
through tactile stimulation of the client with the pelvic and pectoral fins
(Bshary and Wu¨rth, 2001); and (2) flower mimicry of female pollinators
instead of nectar provisioning is found in systems with high pollinator
specificity (Dafni, 1984).
E. Similarities within Different Mutualistic Classes
It is important to note that the similarities in game structures across
mutualisms mentioned above are not necessarily linked to the particular
commodities that are exchanged by partners, but are more general. As a
consequence, for example, some ant-tending mutualisms may share more
features with pollination mutualisms than with mixed species associations
or Mu¨llerian mimicry, although the latter two are protection mutualisms as
well. As an example, interactions between plants with extrafloral nectar
and ants have a game structure similar to interactions between plants and
pollinators that can rob nectar (Table III). On the other hand, there can be
remarkable similarities between specific systems in which similar commod-
ities are exchanged. A striking case is the comparison between cleaner
wrasse L. dimidiatus–predatory client interactions and aphid–ant interac-
tions (Table III). These specific examples emphasize that insights gained
from one mutualistic system may shed light on other mutualisms that at
first sight appear to be very different.
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Generally, transportation mutualisms appear to be more coherent in
game structure than protection mutualisms. The transportation mutualisms
discussed here generally share the following features (Table II): they
involve one sessile and one highly mobile partner, the sessile partner
invests prior to the interaction and moves are therefore sequential, the
mobile partner may be able to actively choose while the sessile partner
cannot, and the sessile partner has little immediate control over the course
of interaction, which is determined mainly by the behavior of the mobile
partner. Among protection mutualisms, mimicry and mixed-species asso-
ciations are very peculiar. Mimicry differs from all other examples because
partners do not interact directly with each other. This generates a suite of
consequences for the game structure; even the game’s terminology is
difficult to apply (Table II). Mixed-species associations differ from all other
examples in that partners do not invest in each other, with another suite of
consequences for the game structure (Table II).
TABLE III
Specific Examples of Strong Similarity in Game Structures Between Mutualisms
That May Initially Appear Different
Parameter
L. dimidiatus–
predator Aphid–ant Plant–ant
Plant–
bumblebee
Dependency High/low High/low High/low High/high
Specificity Low/low Low/low Low/low Low/low
N interactions Repeated Repeated Repeated Variable
Offer
produced
During/
during
During/
during
Before/
during
Before/
during
Moves Simult Simult Seq Seq
Mobility No/yes No/yes No/yes No/yes
Active choice No/yes No/yes No/yes No/yes
Partner
recognition
Pos/pos No/pos No/pos No/pos
Behavioral
options
cd/cd cd/cd cd/cd cd/cd
Investment Cont/a–n Cont/a–n Cont/cont Cont/a–n
Payoff
symmetry
Life–din Life–din Sym Sym
Control Full/high Low/full No/full No/full
aThe first comparison is between the mutualism of the cleaner wrasse L. dimidiatus and a
predatory client with access to several cleaning stations (e.g., a giant moray eel, Gymnothorax
javanicus), and an aphid–ant mutualism (both examples are of protection mutualisms). The
second comparison is between the mutualism of a plant with extrafloral nectar and ants
(protection mutualism), and the mutualism between a plant and bumble bees as pollinator
(transport mutualism). Bumble bees have been chosen as a representative of a pollinator that
can rob nectar. For abbreviations, see Table II.
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The different types of mutualism that we have reviewed are quite diverse
with respect to the degree of variation they exhibit in the states of individ-
ual parameters (Table II). Plant–seed disperser mutualisms appear to be
very uniform, as are mixed-species associations. In Mu¨llerian mimicry
cases, crucial information is lacking for a proper assessment. Other types
of mutualisms show considerably more variation. For example, pollination
mutualisms range from species-specific and obligate to highly generalized
and facultative. Nevertheless, the number of game structures is not over-
whelming. Cleaning mutualisms appear to be the most diverse system with
respect to the number of game structures possible. But even here, the
number of different game structures is limited to about 15 different com-
binations of parameter states. In each of the other systems, free combi-
nations of observed parameter states yield less than 10 potential game
structures. Hence, the diversity in game structures is not so large that it
could not be tackled by theoreticians.
VIII. The Importance of Ecology
The approach to mutualisms that we have taken here focuses on the
question of what factors may promote the persistence of cooperative
behavior and keep cheating at levels that do not threaten the overall
mutualistic outcome. Ideally, to address this question theoretically, the
behavioral options of individuals are identified, the payoffs for each behav-
ioral option are determined, and the interaction is formalized as a game.
If the game yields a solution in which both partners show cooperative
behavior, the mutualism is assumed to be evolutionarily stable against
cheating. However, both short-term and evolutionary stability may depend
on additional, ecological variables that are not easily covered by game
theoretic assessments. Some of these are as follows.
A. The Influence of Population Densities
We identified several mutualistic systems in which population dynamics
of partner species are almost certainly of major importance in determining
payoff values. For example, in pollinating seed parasite mutualisms, high
pollinator densities mean that flowers/inflorescences will become heavily
laden with eggs, raising the possibility that the larvae will eat most of the
developing seeds. Pollinator females arriving after all flowers have been
pollinated also lay eggs, contributing to the cost of the mutualism but adding
no extra benefits. The investment of a pollinator in its partner, as measured
by the ratio of pollination acts to eggs laid, is therefore determined strongly
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by sequence effects (being the first or second or third visitor), not only by
female strategies. The problem for the plants is that they appear to have
little control over the course of the interaction; various mechanisms have
been invoked that would give them control (e.g., Bao and Addicott, 1998;
Ganeshaiah et al., 1995), although most of these have been challenged on
empirical or theoretical grounds. Theoreticians are beginning to explore
how pollinator densities may be kept low enough to yield a net benefit to
the plants, focusing on fruit abortion mechanisms that have been reported
in some systems (e.g., Holland and DeAngelis, 2002; Holland et al., 2001).
In cleaning mutualisms, a high cleaner-to-client ratio means that cleaners
will not find enough parasites on clients to meet their daily food intake.
Some cleaner species, in particular facultative cleaner species, may switch to
other food sources under such circumstances. Full-time cleaners, however,
may behave more parasitically under these conditions and increase feeding
on healthy client tissue, resulting in conflicts between client and cleaner.
Finally, in Mu¨llerian mimicry systems, relative population sizes of spe-
cies within the complex may determine whether individuals of a rarer
species can benefit from a reduction in the production of toxic material
(assuming that it is costly to produce). That is, the balance between
cooperation and conflict in these interactions may be frequency dependent
(Ruxton et al., 2004). A common view, however, is that systems do not shift
back and forth between Mu¨llerian and Batesian mimicry (Mallet, 1999).
B. Population Densities of Third Species
In protection mutualisms, the benefits for the protected partner general-
ly depend critically on the population dynamics of third species, specifical-
ly, the natural enemies that the protector consumes or deters (Bronstein
and Barbosa, 2002). Cleaners and ants generally do not improve the
fitness of their partners if the partners’ enemies are rare or absent. In
cleaning mutualisms, low parasite densities mean that clients simply seek
cleaning less frequently. Hence, as long as clients can control number and
duration of interactions with cleaners, no negative payoffs are to be ex-
pected, although the benefits would shift toward zero under circumstances
of extreme parasite shortage (Johnstone and Bshary, 2002). The concept of
‘‘power’’ in the economic literature is very similar to what we have called
‘‘control over interaction’’ (Bowles and Hammerstein, 2003). Ant mutual-
isms differ from cleaning mutualisms in that partners are usually producing
at least some reward for ants even when they do not require attendance.
Therefore, partner species can incur net fitness costs from their interactions
with ants during periods in which attack risk is low. These costs depend in
part on the costliness of the reward. For example, lycaenids involved in
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relatively obligate and species-specific ant-tending mutualisms produce
particularly high-nutrient secretions, and experience reduced success when
tended in the absence of a predation risk (Pierce et al., 1987). Untended,
secreting lycaenids engaged in more facultative ant-tending mutualisms
have not been found to experience these costs (e.g., Wagner, 1993).
C. The Environment as ‘‘Competitor’’
Any partner in mutualisms involving food offers must outcompete alter-
native food sources that are available and acceptable to individuals of the
partner species. These alternative food sources could be other potential
mutualist species. For example, plants and Homoptera may compete for
access to ant defenders (Sakata and Hashimoto, 2000), and several client
species may compete among each other over access to cleaners (Bshary,
2001). In most cases, however, alternative foods are not associated with
potential mutualists. Cleaners may feed from free-swimming invertebrates,
ants must feed on protein as well as sugar-rich secretions and excretions,
and vertebrate pollinators feed on insects as well as nectar. In addition, in
some nutritional symbioses, critical nutrients may at some times be ob-
tained directly from the environment (e.g., Johnson et al., 1997). Interact-
ing with the partner is therefore at the expense of looking for alternative
options in the environment, thus there are opportunity costs. If these costs
are higher than the benefits of the mutualistic interactions, because of high
abundances of alternative commodities in the environment, a (temporary)
breakdown of mutualistic relationships may be observed, not because one
partner starts cheating, but because it terminates the interaction.
D. Mode of Transmission
In symbioses, a critical question appears to be whether symbionts are
transmitted vertically or horizontally. Any vertical transmission of sym-
bionts into the next host generation may greatly reduce potential for
conflicts, as it is then in the interest of both sides that the partner fares
well (but see Frank, 1996). In contrast, if both sides reproduce indepen-
dently and partners must locate each other at later stages of their life cycle,
it is theoretically possible that exploitation of the partner to such a point
that the partner is no longer able to reproduce (but is still able to offer the
commodity in demand) may be favored in the short term (in the long term,
of course, this may lead the mutualism to break down). A variation of this
question exists in seed parasite pollination mutualisms. Fig wasp females
collect the pollen within the inflorescence from which they emerge and use
it to pollinate the inflorescence that they enter. Hence, the male reproduc-
tive success of the tree is positively coupled with the reproductive success
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of the wasp. In contrast, female yucca and senita moths collect pollen
elsewhere and the male reproductive success of their host plant is therefore
not coupled to the reproductive success of the moths.
IX. Future Avenues with Respect to Evaluation of
Game Structures
There are three major gaps in our knowledge that must be filled if we are
to reach a deeper understanding of how mutualistic behaviors persist.
These points are crucial issues for future empirical studies to address.
1. We need to know more about the exact payoffs associated with
different individual behaviors. There are two main problems to
solve: (a) we need to know whether a reduction in investment into
the partner yields a higher or lower (short-term) benefit to the actor.
This distinction is crucial because it influences the game in the most
fundamental way. If a reduction in investment yields a higher payoff,
then cheating is a profitable option, and partner control mechanisms
must reinforce cooperative behavior if the mutualism is not to be
driven to extinction. If reduced investment in fact carries no net
benefit because it predictably lowers the partner’s investment in
return, then investment into the partner would be a form of pseudor-
eciprocity (Connor, 1986), and cheating is highly unlikely to be an
issue; and (b) we must put all potential costs into the equation. Costs
arise if an individual invests in the partner, if the partner performs a
discrete cheating act (nectar robbing, eating a cleaner, etc.) or if it
reduces the benefits through decreased investment, and if there are
opportunity costs. These latter costs may not influence the course of
interactions, but interactions may simply not take place if opportunity
costs are too high.
2. We need to learn more about how well each player can control how
much it offers to its partner, and the extent to which it can force its
partner to provide commodities in return. Such information is partic-
ularly crucial to assess in mutualistic symbioses. Research on mechan-
isms of nutrient transfer in nitrogen-fixing associations by Lodwig et al.
(2003) sets a prime example of what should be investigated in other
symbioses as well. As long as each player has control over what it
gives but not over what it receives, cooperative behavior may be more
stable against cheating strategies than in situations in which one
player has some power to rob/steal/purloin commodities from its
partner.
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3. We need to understand generalized mutualisms, that is, mutual-
isms that involve several potential partner species, in more detail. For
example, it needs to be established whether or not a suboptimal part-
ner species (e.g., an ant species that does not protect its partner species
as efficiently as does another ant species) has a higher gain from the
interaction than the partner species that provides the optimal service.
Alternatively, suboptimal partners also do not gain high benefits from
the interaction. In other words, suboptimal partners may be better
exploiters, or they may be adapted to other partners themselves, and
perform suboptimally in the association as well.
X. Conclusions
We still have a long way to go to understand how cooperative behavior
persists in mutualisms. To achieve this goal, we need more empirical
information that is structured in a way that it is of direct value for theore-
ticians. An interactive approach, which involves developing theoretical
concepts based on empirical information that are then amenable to further
empirical tests, seems to be most promising at this stage. We hope that our
review provides a step in this direction. While it seems impossible at this
point to develop a single unifying concept for behavioral strategies that
may explain the persistence of cooperative behavior in mutualisms, the
diversity of game structures is not so large that it could not be tackled by
theoreticians. Detailed theoretical and empirical studies of single para-
meters may yield building blocks for more sophisticated integrative models
(Bshary and Noe¨, 2003). Such building blocks must not be confined to
behavior and game theory, but we must incorporate ecological information
and population dynamics as well.
XI. Summary
Currently, there is little information transfer between empiricists work-
ing on cooperative interactions between species (mutualism) and theoreti-
cians who model possible scenarios for the evolution and maintenance of
cooperation between unrelated individuals. Furthermore, both theoretical
and behavioral approaches often fail to consider ecological parameters that
influence behavior. Our goal is to present the wealth of empirical knowl-
edge (both behavioral and ecological) on mutualistic systems in a structure
that may facilitate communication between empiricists and theoreticians.
38
We have chosen eight broad categories of mutualisms that have been
intensely studied and that are relatively well understood. For each system,
we assess possible states of 12 parameters that can help theoreticians to
construct game structures of mutualisms that are built on current empirical
knowledge. We point out how ecological variables may influence behav-
ioral decisions in ways not identified by our parameters. Finally, we eluci-
date similarities between mutualistic systems with respect to game
structures that may not be expected given the diversity of mutualisms with
respect to ecological and evolutionary background. On the basis of
these results, we promote an interactive approach with models based on
empirical knowledge, amenable to further testing.
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